法律解释的去理论化与立场转换——认知心理学的启示被引量：6

De-theorization of Legal Interpretation and the Shift of Perspective: an Insight from Cognitiv Psychology

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摘要学界提出的各种法律解释理论不仅仅在规范层面上无法自圆其说,同时也无法对法院的解释实践作出准确的描述。尽管针对美国联邦最高法院的经验研究表明法院的法律解释实践趋向于新文本主义和法律实用主义,但这些经验研究却没有证明法官遵循了这些解释理论。在对法律解释去理论化之后,如何看待实践中存在的"微观不一致与宏观一致"需要一种立场转换,即关注作为解释主体的法官的认知过程。 Interpretative Theories brought forward by scholars have been deficient not only in normative force but also in the descriptive force. That is why the trend of ＂de - theorization＂ emerges. Although the empirical analysis on the U. S. Supreme Court reveals that the interpretative practice of the Court has been close to the New Textualism and Legal Pragmatism, it does not show that the Court actually follows these theories. After the de - theorization of legal interpretation, a perspective shift to understand the phenomenon of ＂micro -level inconsistencies and broader consistencies＂ is needed, which means the cognitive process of judges as the subject of the interpretation should be considered.

作者王云清

机构地区浙江大学光华法学院

出处《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第3期35-43,共9页 Science of Law：Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law

关键词法律解释去理论化偏见启发式认知融贯性 legal interpretation de - theorization bias heuristic cognitive coherence

分类号 DF0-051 [政治法律—法学理论]

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