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核军控的动力考察--以第一阶段限制战略武器会谈为例 被引量:3

What Drove Nuclear Arms Control? Examining the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
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摘要 冷战时期,美苏核军备的发展与竞争给这两个超级大国进行核军控提出了紧迫性。尽管美苏在核威慑、核军控的理论和实践上存在分歧,但双方共享对避免核战争、实行核军控的共同利益的观念或认知。这是它们在控制战略武器问题上合作的前提,并在第一阶段限制战略武器会谈及其成果中体现出来。然而,战略武器谈判不是在真空中进行的,随着美苏战略态势的消长、新武器技术的发展和各自的军事及政治需要,美苏共享的核军控观念和认知不断演进。利益、观念与理性选择在此过程中紧密联系、相互作用,共同决定核军控合作的发生。 During the Cold War era,the nuclear arsenals of the U.S.and the Soviet Union and their fierce competition raised the urgency of nuclear arms control between the two superpowers.Although the two sides held different positions in both theory and practice about nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control,they shared a common understanding of avoiding a nuclear war and the necessity of nuclear arms control.That shared understanding was a prerequisite to their cooperation on limiting strategic weapons and materialized on the conclusion of the First Strategic Arms Limitations Talks(SALT I).However,negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons were not conducted in a vacuum.The shared understanding between the U.S.and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control continued to evolve as the strategic balance shifted,new weapons technology was developed,and different political and military needs arose.Interests,ideas,and rational choices interacted closely with each other and together determined the cooperation on nuclear arms control.
作者 马晓云 刘磊
出处 《国际政治研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第2期95-109,7,共15页 The Journal of International Studies
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