制度环境、两权分离与家族企业现金股利行为——基于2007-2012年中国家族上市公司的经验证据

Institutional Environment, Separation between Control Rights and Cashflow Rights, and Family Firms' Cash Dividend Behavior: Evidences from China's Listed Family Firms

基于代理理论和法与金融理论,研究了实际控制人控制权及现金流权分离对家族企业现金股利分红意愿及分红水平的影响,并进一步检验了在不同的制度环境下,上述影响的差异性。研究结果表明:实际控制人的控制权与现金流权分离度越大,企业现金分红意愿越低,两权分离度与分红意愿及分红水平呈显著负相关,且在不同的制度环境下,两权分离度对企业股利政策影响存在显著差异。在制度环境越差的地区,这种负相关关系更为显著,而良好的制度环境能够抑制实际控制人这种低分红倾向,在一定程度上反映了外部良好的制度环境能够作为中小投资者利益保护的重要替代性机制。

Based on the agent theory and the combination of law and finance theory, this paper studies the impact of the separation between the control rights of actual controllers and the cashflow rights on the cash dividend intention and level in family business. Furthermore, it tests the difference of the abovementioned impact under different institutional environments. The rsults indicate that the greater the separation degree of the two rights, the lower the willingness to pay cash dividend; the separation degree of the two rights is negatively correlated with cash dividend intension and level significantly. In addition, the impact of separation degree on the dividend policy is quite different under different institutional environments. The negative correlation is more significant when companies are under worse institutional environments, while better institutional environments can restrain the lower dividend tendency of the actual controllers. This suggests that, to a certain degree, better external institutional environment can be an important alternative mechanism to protect the interests of the medinm and small investors.