摘要
创业投资对创业企业IPO的影响主要集中在核证监督和信号传递效应两方面。国外学者利用发达资本市场数据实证发现:有创业投资支持的创业企业IPO首日折价低于无创业创投资支持的创业企业。然而,一些学者利用中国创业板数据实证却发现:有无创业投资参与的企业IPO首日折价率并无显著差别。文章基于中国证券市场运行结构,运用信号博弈和两阶段博弈模型探寻中国创业投资在IPO首日核证监督效应微弱的深层次根源。
The effects of venture capital on enterprise IPO are mainly concentrated in two aspects that are certification supervision and signal transfer effect. Many foreign scholars who used the empirical data of developed capital market found that price discount of entrepreneurs supported by venture capital is lower than entrepreneurship - a startup company unsupported by venture capital. However, some Chinese scholars through using empirical data of Growth Enterprises Market find: whether venture capital participating in enterprise or not, IPO discount rates do not differ significantly. Based on operation structure of China' s securities market, using the signal game and two stage game model, this paper explores deep reason for the weak effect of initial certification supervision to Chinese venture investment in IPO.
出处
《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期42-47,共6页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"产权控制路径下的资本投资与配置效率研究"(71172082/G0206)
关键词
创业投资
IPO折价
信号博弈
两阶段博弈
venture investment
IPO price discount
the signal game
two stage game