双重信息不对称下经济竞赛机制的效率问题

The efficient economic contests under dual information asymmetry

研究在悖逆选择与败德行为两种典型的代理问题并存下 (即双重信息不对称下 )有效的经济竞赛机制之存在性问题 ,首先刻划了双重信息不对称下有效的经济竞赛机制之特性 ,尔后证明了一般情况下激励相容的竞赛机制未能引致异质代理人如实进行自我选择 。

Design of efficient economic contest under dual information asymmetry, i.e. under which adverse selection and moral hazard may co exist, is explored in this paper. First, what an efficient contract of economic contest should be under dual information asymmetry is characterized. Then, the reason why incentive compatible contest can't induce heterogeneous contestants to self select is expressed. Finally, how efficiency could be achieved by the adjustment of monitoring precision is shown.