从二元论到具身现象学:意识本质问题的理论批判

From Dualism to Embodiment Phenomenology: a Theoretical Critique of the Problem of Consciousness Nature

二元论世界观源于人类主体意识的确立,也是人类精神需求的内在倾向。但二元论所确立的心身对立的世界图景使得意识或者以一种独立的形态存在,或被完全否定而消失于无形。具身现象学通过考察"行为"的性质而揭示出的心身同一论,不仅超越了二元论及其结果唯物主义和唯心主义一元论,而且代表了一种以有机生命为着眼点的意识研究的趋势。从二元论到具身概念兴起的过程,是人们对意识范畴的否定之否定的重构之路。

The dualistic Wehanschauung and its mode of thinking not only originated from the arising of humankind self - consciousness, but also derived from man＇ s pursuing for spiritual welfare. Concerning of the question of what consciousness really is, the opposing mind - body view of dualism makes consciousness either an independent entity, or being denied and disappear absolutely. Through detecting the concept ＇ behavior＇ embodiment phenomenology bring forward a new conception of consciousness and identify the mind - body an identical being. It is such mind -body monism not only transcend dualism and its necessary outcomes that be known as materialism and idealism, but also represent a trend of regarding consciousness as an organic function related to the organic life. From dualism to the rise of embodiment concept it was a reconstructed road that is composed of the elimination and resumption of consciousness.