1Abreu, D. Pearce, F. and Stacchetti, E. (1986) 'Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring', Journal of Economics Theory, 39, PP. 261 - 269.
2Akerlof, G. A(1970) 'The Market for"Lemons", Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism', Quarterly Journal of Economics. August , 84 , PP. 488 - 500.
3Cox, James, Roberson, Burce, and Smith, Vernon(1982) 'Theory and Behanvior of single Object Auctions', in V. L. Smith.Research in Experimental Economics, vol.2,PP. 1 -43.
4Cramptpon, P.C. ( 1984)'Bargaining with Incomplete Information:An Infinite Horizon Model with Continuous Uncertainty',Review of Economic Studies, 51 ,PP.579- 594.
5Crocker, K.J. and Snow, A. (1986)'The Efficency of Compertitive Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Informarion', Journal of Public Economics, 26, 2,PP.207 - 220.
6Fishburn, Peter C. (1986) 'A New Model for Decisions Under Uncertainty' ,Economics Letters 21, pp. 127 - 130.
7Shaked, A. And Sutton, J. (1987) 'Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure', ICERD Workong Paper, No. 154, London School of Economcs.
8Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel(1986)'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions', Journal of Business, October, Pt.2,4, PP.251- 278.