地方政府支出竞争与地区投资行为——中国式财政分权框架下的实证研究

Local Fiscal Expenditure Competition and Regional Investment Behavior ——An Empirical Study in China's Fiscal Decentralization Frame

中国财政分权体制下,地方政府间的财政支出竞争广泛存在。建立纳入财政支出分权、地方政府财政支出及支出竞争的企业投资决策计量模型。结论显示:地方政府财政支出横向竞争和纵向竞争对地区投资行为影响具有差异性并存在长期效应。为实现地方政府支出竞争的良性发展应将更多的资源投入到有利于提高地区整体投资环境的领域,同时继续完善中央和地方关系。

Under China＇s fiscal decentralization, fiscal expenditure competition among local governments is a widespread phenomenon. The paper buihs into the fiscal expenditure decentralization, fiscal expenditure and government expenditure of local competition of enterprise investment decision model. The result shows that influence of local government expenditure and horizontal competition and longitudinal competition on regional investment behavior is different and there is a long-term effect. To realize benign development expenditure of local government competition more resources should be invested to improve the environment overall investment areas, at the same time optimize the relationship between central and local government.