我国上市公司高管薪酬激励:绝对激励与相对激励

Top Management Compensation Incentive of Chinese Public Companies: Absolute Incentive and Relative Incentive

笔者选取2001年-2011年我国上市公司样本,实证分析研究了我国上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效以及市场绩效之间的关系.研究结果显示,随着薪酬制度的改革与完善,上市公司已逐步建立起与绩效挂钩的薪酬激励机制,中央控股企业、地方性国有企业及民营企业高管薪酬都与企业绩效密切相关.此外,“高绩效”企业实行相对激励与绝对激励相结合的方式,“低绩效”企业则实行绝对激励.

This article aims to study the relations of top management compensation, company performance and market performance in China using 2001 -2011 data. We finds out that salary motivation system related with the performance has been built preliminarily dur- ing the development of remuneration reform and most of the central holding companies, while local state-owned companies and private companies implement absolute incentive. Besides, when the company performance surpasses the market performance, it implements the combination of absolute incentive and relative incentive; when the company performance is worse than the market performance, it im- plements absolute incentive, which reveals that the incentive method of top management compensation has asymmetric effects.