经理权力、市场化进程与经理超额薪酬——基于不同产权性质的比较分析

Manager Power,Marketing Process and Manager Excessive Compensation—— A Comparative Analysis of Different Property Right

笔者以我国上市公司为研究样本,实证分析在不同产权性质的企业中,市场化进程对于经理权力抑制作用所产生的差异。研究结果表明,经理权力越大,经理所获得的超额薪酬越多;企业所处的外部制度环境能够显著影响经理通过个人权力攫取超额薪酬的能力;外部制度环境对于经理权力的影响在国有企业中表现得更为明显。

This paper adopts data of China＇ s A-share listed companies, empirical by tests whether manager power and marketing process can influence manager excessive compensation, as well as enterprises with different property right, the difference inhibition of manager power by marketing process. The research finds out that： first, the greater the manager power, the more the manager compen- sation ; second, marketing process can effectively restrain the effect of manager power on excessive compensation ; third, there is an ob- vious inhibition effect of marketing process on manager power in state-owned enterprises.