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霍尔姆斯特伦对微观经济学的贡献

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摘要 霍尔姆斯特伦是当代著名的微观经济学家。因其团队激励理论而奠定了在信息经济学领域的权威地位。他以团队激励机制为基础,详细论证了显性契约和隐性契约问题,形成了独具特色的委托一代理理论;并将委托一代理理论系统化创立了企业激励理论;同时,将信息不对称引入金融市场,探讨了金融危机的微观基础及金融危机发生的宏观机制。
作者 方臻旻
出处 《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期104-114,共11页 Economic Perspectives
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