意向性本体论地位问题的折中解答

The Compromise on the Solution to the Ontological Status of Intentionality

意向性的本体论地位问题,是心灵哲学中的前沿和焦点问题,主要有两种回答,一是意向性怀疑论或取消论,二是意向实在论。随着研究的深入,这两种理论的缺陷逐渐暴露出来,而一种新的、既融合了已有理论的合理因素又有诸多超越的折中理论脱颖而出。它尚在发展之中,但已显示出强大的生命力。折中理论有多种形式,其共同点在于,在"实在""存在"等本体论概念上大做文章,纷纷提出关于存在的新理论,然后据以说明意向性的本体论地位。这些新的理论既提出了解决心灵哲学问题的新方案,又对相关本体论问题作了不无创新的解答。

There are two solutions to the ontological status of intentionality,which is the front edge and focus of philosophy of mind,one is intentionality skepticism or Eliminativism;the other is intentionality realism.Howev-er,with the development of philosophy of mind,the defects of both theories are gradually exposed.A novel eclec-tic theory embracing both the conventionally plausible factors and innovative ideas stands out.Moreover,it shows strong vitality,though still in progress,and demonstrates different forms,which share one thing in common that the new theories of being all base their explanation of the ontological status of intentionality on a different interpreta-tion of the ontological concepts like “substance”and “existence”.All the new theories are worth attention and study,since they not only put forward a new proposal to the solution to the issue of philosophy of mind,but also resolve the ontological issue from a different perspective.