碳排放权初始分配下企业损益的分析

Analysis on Firm's Cost and Earning with Initial Distribution Methods of Tradable Carbon Permits

文章基于企业,重点分析了祖父继承法(Grandfathering)、竞价法(Auction)和产出标准法(General Performance Standard)三种普遍认同的碳排放权初始分配方式下企业的成本收益结构。在计划管理机制内,产品价格受管制,企业的首要目的是保持盈亏平衡。由于缺少竞争压力的企业缺乏发展低碳、清洁能源等技术的动力,管理者应当以竞价法拍卖初始排放权,并根据企业的减排和竞拍成本适当调整产品价格,同时将拍卖收入有效的投入碳捕获、清洁能源、环境保护以及改善生活环境等领域,使其效益最大化。在市场管理机制内,企业可以利用成本转嫁机制将排放权获取成本转移给消费者。产品需求价格弹性、边际产出的碳损失、碳排放权的价格供给弹性、煤的价格需求弹性(即燃料成本波动)等因素共同影响着企业参与碳减排体系的效益。文章最后对我国燃煤发电行业建立碳排放权的交易体系提出对策建议。

This article theoretically analyses on the impact of three initial distribution methods of tradable carbon permits over involved firms, including the terms of cost and earning, best product price, net carbon income of each marginal product and firm＇s added value. The three methods studied here are grandfathering, auction and general performance standard. Under the system of perfectly competitive market, the price of products fluctuates freely and enterprises confirm the premium price and maximum profit of their products. Factors like marginal output of the carbon gains and losses, fluctuation in fuel cost, price elasticity of product market, the initial acquisition cost of tradable carbon permits and the net profit of the carbon market co-determine the maximum profit of enterprises. According to the features of the three initial distribution methods, auction, undoubtedly, is the one which brings maximum losses to enterprises, while, general performance standard can best realize optimization for industry and enterprises, and grandfathering gives equal treatment to all enterprises which have no extra burden or obvious subsidies.