不完全信息下逆向供应链激励机制研究

Study on the Incentive Mechanism in Reverse Supply Chain with Asymmetric

针对一个制造商和两个竞争零售商构成的逆向供应链,在零售商成本信息为不完全信息前提下,运用信号甄别和委托代理理论探讨政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府对制造商实施奖励政策和政府对零售商实施奖励政策三种情形下,制造商提供给零售商的激励合同。研究结果表明:零售商竞争程度越大,制造商提供的收益提成越小,逆向供应链整体收益越大;在两种奖励力度相同的情况下政府对制造商实施奖励政策后逆向供应链整体收益最大。

For the reverse supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two competitive retailers, on the premise that retailers＇ cost information is asymmetric, we use signal screening and Principal-Agent Theory to explore incentive contracts that manufacturer offers in three situations such as when government does not participate in reverse supply chain operation, when government implements reward policy to the manufacturer and when government implements reward policy to retailers. The results of the study show that： as retailers＇ competing degree increases, the commission rates that the manufacturer provides decrease while the overall revenue of the reverse supply chain increases; under the condition that two kinds of rewards strength is equal, when government implements reward policy to manufacturer, the overall revenue of reverse supply chain reaches maximum.