期刊文献+

监理与承包商合谋作假的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Collusion Fraud of Supervision and Contractor
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摘要 本文从分析"监理与承包商合谋"的动机及特征入手,建立"监理与承包商合谋"博弈模型。通过模型求解分析,提出业主目标的实现很大程度上依赖于增加监督成效、加大惩罚力度、减少监督成本、做好教育宣传等综合措施。 From the analysis of motives and characteristics of "supervisor and contractor collusion", this paper established the game model. Through model solving and analysis, this paper concluded that the realization of client's goal to a large extent depended on a number of comprehensive measures, such as increasing effectiveness of supervision, increasing penalties, reducing the cost of supervision, doing well education advocacy.
作者 金晓萍
出处 《价值工程》 2014年第17期71-72,共2页 Value Engineering
关键词 监理 承包商 合谋 博弈分析 supervision contractor collusion game analysis
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