摘要
作为深层生态学和生态整体主义理论基础的自然内在价值论,遭遇了人类中心主义从主体论和认识论两个角度提出的挑战,深层生态学定义的人的主体性以及生态整体主义认识论的有效性受到了质疑。著名生态社会学家默里·布克金毫不留情地批评自然内在价值幼稚愚蠢。但是,从西方环境整体主义伦理学的重要代表罗尔斯顿、深层生态学提倡者阿恩·奈斯和盖娅理论贡献人林恩·马古利斯对内在价值论的言说中可以发现,自然内在价值乃是对自然存在事态的反思的合理结论,深层生态学扩大了人类主体性的边界,作为一个隐喻嵌于深层生态学言说中的自然内在价值概念有其合法性。
The intrinsic value of nature, which underlies the deep ecology and the ecological holism, encounters challenges posed by anthropocentrism from subjective perspective and epistemological perspective. Subjectivity defined by deep ecology and the effectiveness of ecological holist epistemology are thus questioned. Murray Bookchin, a famous ecological socialist, reprimands the concept of intrinsic value as na?ve and stupid, it is revealed by Holmes Rolston the representative of western holist ecological ethics, Arne Naess the promoter of deep ecology, and Lynn Margulis the contributor to Gala Theory that the intrinsic value of nature as a conclusion derives reasonably from reflections on the state affair of nature. As deep ecology ex pands the boundary of human subjectivity, the intrinsic value of nature as a metaphor embedded into deep ecological discourse is legitimate.
出处
《南京工程学院学报(社会科学版)》
2014年第2期25-30,共6页
Journal of Nanjing Institute of Technology:Social Science Edition
关键词
自然内在价值
主体性
认识论
深层生态学
盖娅理论
intrinsic value of nature
subjectivity
epistemology
deep ecology
Gaia Theory