我国跨界流域环境治理政策困境研究——以太湖流域治理的利益机制分析为例

Research on the Dilemma of Environmental Governance Policies of Cross-border River Basin——Taking Interest Mechanism Analysis of Governing Tai Lake Basin as an Example

流域环境的整体性和系统性与流域环境政策的跨区域性之间的矛盾使得流域环境政策在区域合作中难以起到应有的作用。本文从环境政策所涉及的各方利益互动的角度,运用博弈论和利益相关者理论,以太湖地区的流域环境政策为例,通过分析中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府间在环境政策制定和实施过程中的博弈过程来探讨流域环境保护的利益驱动机制,并依据其分析结果提出相关政策建议。

The contradictions between the entirety and systematicness of basin environment and the cross-region of basin environment policies make it difficult for basin environment policies to play roles in regional cooperation. This paper, from the view of the interests interaction of all parties which the basin environment policies concern,based on game theory and stakeholder theory, taking the basin enviromnent policies of Tai Lake as an example, through the analysis of the game process of making and implementing the environmental policies between the central and local governments and between local governments, explores the interests driving mechanism of the basin environment protection, then it puts forward some relevant policy suggestions on the basis of the analysis results.