摘要
低水平重复投资建设 ,“大而全、小而全”已经成为我国经济发展中的一个顽症。作为宏观调控的中央政府要利用有效的经济杠杆约束地方政府的投资行为 ,使有限资源得到最合理的配置。文章从完全信息条件下的博弈论观点分析了各级地方政府的投资行为 ,并根据该成因提出解决办法的建议。
Low-level repeated construction has become a incorrigible illness for our country's economic development. The central government that performs function of macro adjustment can utilize effectively economic lever to restrain the local government's investment behavior, so that the limited resources could be rationally allocated. From point view of game theory under the condition of full information, this article analyses all level local government's investment behavior. Accordingly the suggestions of resolving methods are put forward.
出处
《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》
2000年第2期45-48,共4页
Journal of Fujian School of Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management