终极控制人、事务所变更与审计质量——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Ultimate Controller,Auditor Switch and Audit Quality:Evidence from China's Listed Companies

基于终极产权论和委托代理理论,从审计需求视角探讨审计质量的影响因素。以我国2006—2010年A股上市公司作为研究样本,追溯至上市公司的终极控制人,结合事务所变更的动态变量,研究终极控制人及其性质对会计师事务所选择的影响。实证发现,我国上市公司终极控制人及其性质的变更均会导致会计师事务所的变更,并且当终极控制人性质由非国家控制人变更为国家控制人时,企业对会计师事务所的选择会倾向于由高质量所变更为低质量所。研究结果表明,终极控制人及其性质是影响我国上市公司审计质量的重要因素之一。

This paper explores the determinants of audit quality from the perspective of audit demand based on the ultimate ownership theory and the principal-agent theory. We choose A-share listed companies＇ data from 2006 to 2010 to discuss the connection between ultimate controllers and the selected audit firms. The evidence indicates that firstly, companies switch ulti- mate controllers much more frequently than switch their audit firms. Secondly, the change of ultimate controllers＇ character will also cause the accounting firms＇ switch. Thirdly, when the ultimate controllers are changed from non-state controller to state controller, the audit quality will be reduced. The findings reflect the ultimate ownership is one of the main determinants of the audit quality of listed companies.