董事网络的结构洞特征与公司并购

Structural Hole of Board Networks and M&A

本文基于结构洞理论,实证研究了我国上市公司董事网络的结构洞特征对公司并购行为的影响。研究发现,由于公司在董事网络中的结构洞位置有助于公司更加迅速地获取并购信息与并购机会,公司拥有结构洞的丰富程度与并购活动呈显著正相关关系。进一步研究发现,在市场中介组织发育越落后的地区,公司结构洞位置对并购行为的促进作用越明显。本文还进一步对独立董事与非独立董事结构洞位置作用的差异进行了检验,发现由于独立董事享有弱联结优势,独立董事的结构洞位置对并购的促进作用要强于非独立董事。本文的研究发现丰富了公司并购和社会网络的研究成果。

Based on the structural hole theory,this paper investigates the influence of the structural hole of director network of listed companies on its M&A.The result shows that the quantity of structural holes occupied by directors is positively related to the frequency of M&A. Furthermore,it also shows that the active role of network position is more obvious in the region where the development of market intermediaries is lagged. We compare the roles of structural holes occupied by independent directors and those occupied by internal directors. The result shows that structural holes occupied by independent directors can more effectively promote M&A than those occupied by internal directors in that independent directors have advantages of weak ties. This paper complements the literature of M&A and the literature of social networks.