基于信号博弈的企业外部招聘行为分析

Analysis of Enterprises' External Recruitment Behavior Based on Signaling Game

企业外部招聘经常会面临企业与应聘者之间的信息不对称问题。应用信号博弈方法,分析企业与应聘者之间的信息不对称问题。当信号成本在不同应聘者之间存在差异性时,市场完全成功的分离均衡是企业外部招聘存在的唯一精炼贝叶斯博弈均衡。分析结论有助于企业利用信号成本来识别应聘者的真实能力,进而提高非对称信息条件下企业外部招聘的效率。

Enterprises often face the problem of asymmetric information between enterprise and candidates when performing external recruitment. This paper analyzes the problem of asymmetric information between enterprise and candidates by the method of signaling game. The entire successful separating equilibrium of market is the only refined Bayesian game equilibrium for enterprise external recruitment when the cost of information has difference between the different types of candidates. Conclusions contribute to the enterprise to identify the true ability of applicants by using signal cost, which improve the efficiency under the condition of asymmetric information of enterprise external recruitment.