央地博弈视角的化解产能过剩新政解读

On solution of excess production capacity's new policy from the angle of relation between central and local government

进入21世纪以来,我国学术与实践界有关产能过剩的讨论就没有停止过,中央政府以及有关部门也一再出台抑制产能过剩的政策文件,但旨在抑制产能过剩的政策为什么没有获得应有的效果?该文从中央与地方政府博弈的视角,以中央政府为委托人,地方政府为代理人,利用委托—代理模型,分析两者各自不同的目标和收益函数,以此解释产能过剩屡抑不止的原因,并根据激励相容理论对2013年的新政进行解读,展望新政效果。

since the 21st century, discussion about our country＇s excess capacity is not stopped in academ- ic and practice world, the central government and rele- vant departments also curb overcapacity policy docu- ment again and again, but curbing overcapacity attain the effect of the policy of why not aimed at？ From the perspective of the central and local governments game, in the central government for the trustor, the local government for agent, using the principal-agent model, analysis the different objectives and revenue func- tion, to explain the reason of failures to suppression excess capacity, and according to the theory of incen- rive compatibility in 2013 of the New Deal, looking forward to the New Deal,