治理特征、治理环境与关联交易——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

Governance Characteristics, Governance Environment and Related Party Transactions: Evidence from A-share Listed Companies in China

利用2006～2012年上市公司财务数据检验了关联交易与公司内部治理机制及外部治理环境的关系。研究发现，首先，股权集中度越高，控制权与现金流量权分离程度越大，关联交易越多。股权制衡度是对关联交易的有效制约，控股股东持股比例与关联交易存在倒U型关系。其次，机构投资者持股、两职合一对控制关联交易发挥了一定作用，独立董事比例对关联交易影响不显著。第三，国有控股和集团组织形式对关联交易影响显著。“四大”审计或者境外发行股票，可有效抑制关联交易。第四，受政府保护行业和竞争激烈行业的关联交易较多，减少政府对企业干预程度对关联交易影响不显著。研究还发现，利用主成分分析法构建的公司治理综合指数G—score与关联交易显著负相关，说明良好的公司治理结构确实能够降低关联交易的概率和规模。

This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanism, outer environment and related party transactions （RPTs） using listed companies＇ financial data from 2006 to 2012 in China. The thesis has the following results. Firstly, the higher the degree of share concentration and separation of control right and cash flow right are, the more related party transactions will be. Secondly, institution shareholding and the combination of director and general manager play a certain role in controlling RPTs, ratio of independence director is not significant to RPTs. Thirdly, state-controlled and group-affiliated companies are significant to RPTs and BIG4 auditing or issuing stock at foreign markets can effectively inhibit RPTs. Fourthly, there are more RPTs in industries protected by government or in high competition industries, but the less government intervention has no impact on RPTs. It also does principal component analysis （PCA） and finds that corporate governance complex index, G-score, is significantly negative related to RPTs, which demonstrates that good governance structure can effectively reduce the probability and scale of RPTs.