摘要
文章研究了影响中国民营企业代际传承意愿的影响因素。这里的传承意愿包括两个方面:一是创始人愿不愿意传承的问题;二是愿意传承的创始人倾向于传给子女还是职业经理人的问题。文章在文献分析的基础上提出研究假设,利用2008年全国工商联的第八次全国私营企业调查数据构建二元罗吉斯特回归模型分析发现:影响民企创始人传不传和传给谁意愿的重要因素是创始人的决策权力,其次是个人权益和家庭利益。民企的组织约束力对传承意愿影响不显著。这些发现基本支持了本文提出的影响民企创始人传承意愿形成的"权利决定论",即创始人的决策权越大,越不愿放权。决策权和涉及利益越大,越倾向于传给子女。所以,为了促使创始人更愿意放权,需要进行合理的组织设计削弱创始人的决策权;同时更加规范和落实监管机构的运作,使其真正参与企业的重大决策。
This article studies factors on the willingness of leadership succession of private enterprises in China. There are two issues associated with the willingness of leadership succession. The first issue is whether or not founders are willing to transfer the leadership. The second issue is whether founders who are willing to transfer the leadership tend to transfer it to their children or to professional executives. This article propose research hypotheses based on the literature review, and builds binary logistic regres- sions based on data from the Eighth National Survey of Chinese Private Enterprises conducted by the All-China Federation of Indus-try, Business and some other official organizat!ons in 2008. We found that most of Chinese private enterprise founders were willing to delegate their power to well-trained executives for the professional management and lasting growth of their enterprises. Second, the significant factors impacting the willingness of leadership transfer and willingness to delegate leadership to executives include the de- cision-making power of founders, individual and family equities while the effect of constraint committees (e. g. board of directors, supervision committee, shareholder committee etc. ) within the enterprises is not significant. These findings support our "power-in- terests determinism" argument. That is, the higher the decision-making power that founders hold, the less that they are willing to give up leadership. For those who are willing to transfer leadership, the higher the power and interests of themselves and their fami- lies, the less they were willing to delegate leadership to executives. In order to increase founders' willingness of leadership succes- sion, we should make good organizational designs to undermine founder's decision-making power and dilute their individual and fami- ly equities. At the same time, we should ensure these supervision organizations participate in the decision-making process of private enterprises.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期43-54,共12页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
教育部博士点基金项目(20110142120087)
教育部人文社科基金一般项目(09YJA630045)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71072030)
关键词
民营企业
创始人
传承意愿
权力
利益
private enterprise
founder
willingness of leadership delegation
power
interests