异质性企业、大股东风格差异与控制权的双面治理效应——基于制度与企业特征调节的上市公司非平衡面板数据的新证据

The Double-sided Governance Effects of Major Shareholder with Different Styles and Control Rights in Heterogeneous Firm——New Evidence from Listed Companies' Unbalanced Panel Data Based on Adjustment of Institution and Firm Heterogeneity

不同控制权配置风格的大股东,在治理效应上表现出双面性:一些大股东会获取控制权私有收益,损害公司价值而表现出掏空效应;而另一些大股东会给企业注入资源促进企业价值增长,而表现为支持效应。而且双面效应随着大股东配置特征改变而发生转化。本文有别于前人研究,选取中国资本市场制度环境稳定时期2007—2011年的9019个样本数据,设计有效变量控制企业异质性特征影响,从大股东控制权配置视角研究其对公司价值的支持与掏空效应。研究发现国家大股东有明显掏空公司特性;法人大股东随着控制程度的变化,从支持机制向掏空机制转化,对企业价值影响呈现出倒U型特征。

The major shareholders with different control right styles have double-sided governance effects. Some major shareholders get private benefits of control and damage firm value, which has the tunneling effect. However, some major shareholders infuse firm with resources to promote the growth of value, which has the supporting effect. The double-sided effects will transform with the change of major shareholder＇ s configuration feature. The study is different from previous researches to some extent. The paper selects 9109 sample data from 2007 to 2011 when China＇ s capital market was in stable institutional environment, designs effective variables to control the firm heterogeneity, and studies the supporting effect and tunneling effect from the perspective of major shareholders＇ control right configuration. It finds that the nation- al major shareholders have the obvious features of tunneling firm while the legal major shareholders show two different effects, which depend on the control degree ： with the rise of control degree, it will change from supporting mechanism to tunneling mechanism and show inverted U-shaped features.