具有双边道德风险的服务外包线性分成契约

Bilateral Moral Hazard and Linear Revenue-sharing Contract in Service Outsourcing

运用团队生产模型,考察了存在双边道德风险下发包方参与生产的服务外包最优线性分成契约。分析了产出弹性系数、成本系数和谈判力因子对线性分成契约的影响,指出最优线性分成比例由产出弹性系数确定。研究表明:谈判能力不影响最优线性分成比例、双方参与努力水平和系统产出,但能决定双方从合作中分享的剩余。最后,用数值算例验证了主要结论。

Using team production model, we investigate a linear revenue-sharing contract for service outsourcing with participation of an enterprise customer and bilateral moral hazard. We analyze the effect of output elastic coefficients, cost coefficients and bargaining powers of an enterprise customer and a services provider on the optimal linear revenue-sharing contract, and show that the optimal linear sharing ratio is determined only by the participants＇ output elastic coefficients. We conclude that the participants＇ bargaining power have no impact on the optimal linear ratio, participation efforts of the participants and the system output; however, it determines the distribution of collaborative residual between the enterprise customer and the service provider. Managerial insights are provided based on the research and are verified by numerical examples.