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台湾地区上市柜公司信息揭露评鉴制度之探讨

A Study of Information Disclosure Evaluation System in Taiwan Listed Companies
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摘要 为解决信息不对称及产生的逆选择与道德危机问题,信息揭露扮演了举足轻重的角色。公司经营权自所有权分出后,须靠股东之间的监督,以解决管理者与股东间的"信息不对称"问题。同时,股东之监督必定产生"代理成本",只有靠信息的顺畅流通,使所有权拥有者获得正确且丰富的信息,才能在兼顾经营效率业绩的同时,降低代理成本。证券市场的监理以公开揭露、市场信息透明为最高指导原则,通过推行信息之透明度制度,以保护善良投资人。为此,台湾地区自2003年设置了"信息揭露评鉴系统",以提升企业整体信息揭露的透明度,落实公司治理,并取得了良好的效果。 Information disclosure plays a vital role in solving information asymmetry and its resulting adverse selection and moral crisis. With the management rights separated from company ownership, shareholders' supervision must be relied on to solve the "information asymmetry" between managers and shareholders, and the resulting "agency costs" from such a supervision can be reduced while keeping a good operating efficiency performance only when information flows smoothly and the ownership possessors have access to exact and rich information. The stock market supervision takes public disclosure and information transparency as its supreme guiding principle and protects its investors via information transparency systems. Accordingly, Taiwan set up "the Information Disclosure Evaluation System" in 2003 to improve the transparency of company information disclosure as well as company management, and has achieved good results ever since.
作者 柯柏成
出处 《山东财政学院学报》 2014年第3期18-22,48,共6页 Journal of Shandong Finance Institute
关键词 信息揭露 信息揭露评鉴 信息不对称 代理成本 information disclosure information disclosure evaluation information asymmetry agency cost
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