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信访悖论的成本—效益分析

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Paradox of Complaint Settlement System
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摘要 信访制度尽管备受诘难,却在当代中国社会具有强大的生命力,这一悖论的深层根源需在成本—效益的分析视阈内得以阐明。因而,强化信访机制的制度化、规范化和程序化特征,并将其功能定位为权利救济的补充—过滤机制以及民意表达的启动—监督机制,是适应当代中国社会转型现状,使信访制度实现"帕累托最优"的有效路径。 Although the complaint settlement system, as an important system of rights remedy, has many defects, it has great vitality in contemporary China This paradox has to be theoretically expounded by using the method of cost-benefit analysis. The system is suggested to be institutionalized, standardized and procedurally characterized, and its function positioned as the adminicular-filtering system of rights remedy, and the start-supervision system of public opinion expression in order to be better adapted to China' s current situation, and to realise the "Pareto optimal".
作者 王荔
出处 《山东科技大学学报(社会科学版)》 2014年第1期26-32,共7页 Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"信访救济的法理与制度研究"(GK261002026) 西安市社科基金重点项目"西安高新区信访维稳模式及对策研究"(11gx49)
关键词 信访悖论 成本—效益分析 边际分析 权利救济 paradox of complaint settlement system cost-benefit analysis marginal benefit analysis rights remedy
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