摘要
构造了一个理论模型 ,来解释国有企业管理体制作为不对称信息的内部资源配置方案时 ,企业激励机制的形成。首先对中国国有企业管理体制模型的演化过程进行了研究 ,然后描述了一个新的组织模型。该模型模拟了嵌入一种标准公司结构的国有企业现代企业制度的特征 ,并且得到了当企业具有道德危害时 ,该模型的一种解。
A theoretical model is constructed to explain the formation of internal incentive mechanism in which state owned enterprise management system is treated as intraenterprises resource allocation with asymmetric information.The evolving of the management system model in China is investigated.A new organizational model is described which simulates a characteristic of the modern enterprise system embodied in standard modern companies.The model of a solution to the problem in the presence of moral hazard is given.
出处
《工业工程》
2001年第1期1-4,共4页
Industrial Engineering Journal
