渠道竞争与品牌竞争共存时的Stackelberg定价博弈分析

Analysis of Stackelberg pricing policies under channel and brand competition

研究了供应链中渠道竞争与品牌竞争共存时,制造商与零售商的定价博弈问题.基于不同的市场权力结构,分别建立了制造商占主导的Stackelberg定价博弈模型和零售商占主导的Stackelberg定价博弈模型,对模型进行求解和分析;并通过数值算例验证了模型的有效性,分析了价格敏感性对各渠道产品需求量及制造商和零售商利润的影响.研究认为:制造商与零售商可以通过增加消费者对自身品牌的忠诚度来增加利润,而制造商不能通过建立制造商品牌的渠道忠诚度来增加利润;Stackelberg定价博弈的主导者有获得更大利润的优势.

The pricing game of the manufacturer and retailer when both channel competition and brand competition exist in the supply chain is studied. Based on different market power structures, the manufacturer Stackelberg game model and retailer Stackelberg game model are established. The equilibrium solutions of the models are given. Finally, the validity of those models is verified through a numerical example, and the effects of price sensitivities on the demands of every channel and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are analyzed. As a result , the managerial implications is obtained that it is beneficial for the increase of supply chain members′ profit to establish brand loyalty of their products, but it is not beneficial for the increase of manufacturer′s profit to establish channel loyalty, and the leader of the Stackelberg game has the advantage of gaining more profits.