摘要
意向行动理论是塞尔行动哲学的重点,研究对象是人类有意识、有目标的行动。首先,梳理意向行动的构成要素,包括"慎思"、"在先意向"、"行动中意向"、"行动"和"间隔"。其次,通过解析要素的相互关系,廓清意向行动的结构和运作模式,以图形方式展现出来。最后,评述奥肖尼斯和帕切里关于"在先意向"和"行动中意向"的一系列批判性观点。以此为基础,论证如何通过"行动中意向"来消解早期行动因果理论的异常因果链问题。
Searle's Theory of Intentional Action is the key point in his philosophy of action; its main research object is human's conscious and goal-directed action. Firstly, the constituent elements of intentional action should be connotationally analyzed, including Deliberation, Prior Intention, Intention in Action, Action and Gap. Secondly, the structure and oper- ating mode of intentional action are graphically represented through discussion of the interrelationships of these constituent elements. Finally, critical standpoints of O'Shaughnessy and Pacherie about "prior intention" and "intention in action" are remarked, based on which the paper demonstrates how "intention in action" can help to solve the deviant causal chain in early version of the causal theory of action.
出处
《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期275-280,共6页
Journal of Tianjin University:Social Sciences
关键词
约翰·塞尔
意向行动
行动中意向
意向行动理论
行动哲学
John · Searle
intentional action
intention in action
theory of intentional action
philosophy of action