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基于非标准偏好和信念的公司治理主体决策行为研究——一个理论框架 被引量:1

Research on the Behavior of Corporate Governance Core Stakeholders under the Nonstandard Preferences and Beliefs——A Theoretical Model
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摘要 围绕投资者和经营者这两个公司治理核心利益主体探讨了其决策行为的不完全理性表现,指出公司治理主体通常具有非标准偏好和信念,从而导致其决策行为表现出系统性的偏差。结合传统公司治理研究框架的不足和行为公司治理研究的热点,梳理出了公司治理主体决策行为的偏好结构和信念特征。借助非标准偏好和信念等关键性决策元素构建出了基于非标准偏好和信念的行为公司治理理论框架,并提出了未来的重点研究方向。 This paper analyzes the incomplete rational decision-making behavior of investors and operators which are the twocore stakeholders of corporate governance. It finds out that they have nonstandard preferences and beliefs, which lead to asystematic bias in their decision-making behaviors. Combining the deficiencies of traditional corporate governance researchframework and research hotspots of behavioral corporate governance, it teases out the preference structures and belief charac-teristics of the decision-making behavior of corporate governance core stakeholders. With the key decision-making elementsof nonstandard preferences and nonstandard beliefs, it constructs the behavioral corporate governance theoretical frameworkand points out the key research areas and future research directions.
作者 任广乾
机构地区 郑州大学商学院
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第6期56-59,64,共5页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金联合基金项目(U1304705) 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(10JJD630002) 河南省教育厅科学技术研究重点项目资助计划软科学项目(13A630594)
关键词 非标准偏好 非标准信念 公司治理利益主体 决策行为 nonstandard preference nonstandard belief corporate governance main stakeholders decision-making behavior
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