供应链应收账款融资和商业信用联合决策研究

Research on decision-making with supply chain accounts receivable financing combined trade credit

在由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的二级供应链中,当制造商生产资金受到约束,但仍为零售商提供商业信用时,从供应链内部企业利益最大化角度出发,建立了随机需求下的供应链决策模型.分别给出了供应链在分散决策和集中决策下,制造商愿意采用应收账款进行融资的条件,得到了供应链的最优产量和系统利润.通过算例,对比分析了两种决策下的供应链产量和系统利润的变化情况.研究表明:相对分散决策而言,集中决策下制造商更愿意采用应收账款进行融资;在制造商接受应收账款融资的前提下,对于销售周期短的产品,当制造商给予零售商一定商业信用期时,供应链在分散决策下的系统利润将大于集中决策下的利润.反之对于销售周期长的产品,供应链在集中决策下的利润更大.

In a two-level supply chain consisted of one manufacture and one retailer, when manufacture is short of production capital, but still provides trade credit to the retailer, from the view of maximizing the profits of enterprises in supply chain, this paper constructed a decision-making model for supply chain under random demand. For supply chain decentralized decision and centralized decision, the conditions that manufacture is willing to take accounts re- ceivable financing are given, the supply chain＇s optimal production output and system profit are presented respectively. Through numerical analysis, this paper analyzed the variations of supply chain＇s output and profit. Our research shows that compared to decentralized decision, the manufacture prefers to take accounts receivable financing in centralized decision. Based on the manufacture＇s acceptance of accounts receivable financing, as for products with short sales cycles, when manufacture gives retailer some trade credit term, the supply chain＇s profit will be larger in decentralized decision than in centralized decision. On the contrary, as for products with long sales cycles, the supply chain＇s profit will be larger in centralized decision.