直觉、自然主义与认识论——H.科恩布里斯教授访谈

Intuition,Naturalism and Epistemology:An Interview with Hilary Kornblith

直觉在哲学中的应用颇为广泛,无论是伦理学、心智哲学,还是形而上学、语言哲学均如此,认识论中直觉的地位更加不容忽视。不过无论是哲学哪个领域中的直觉均不同于生活中的直觉,科恩布里斯认为直觉在哲学理论探讨中所起的作用就像观测结果在科学理论探讨中的作用,不过这并不等于说直觉是完全可靠的,它与日常生活直觉的区别在于其对假设情形的运用与判断的类别划分。科恩布里斯作为实在论者,更强调对知识本质的研究,而不是停留在知识的概念层面;作为自然主义者,他乐于见到来自科学领域的研究成果为直觉的认识提供论证资源,愿意用科学尤其是心理学中的视觉等机制类比于直觉及其运作机制。因此,即便传统哲学强调"冥思"的方法,但我们没有理由将哲学的理论探讨局限在任何方法中,这样的方法将会使得我们与科学的结果隔绝,就像完全诉诸直觉那样,其结果必然是限制哲学的理论探讨。

We can easily see the application of intuition in philosophy,not just in ethics,philosophy of mind,but metaphysics and philosophy of language as well.And its status in epistemology would undoubtedly be found.However,intuition in all the subfields of philosophy is different from that in everyday life.Hilary Kornblith holds that the role that intuition plays in philosophical theorizing is much like that observation in scientific theorizing,but that is not to say intuition is completely reliable and the fundamental distinctions between them lie in two,ie.die application of hypothetical cases and classificatory judgments.As a realist,Kornblith put more emphasis on the study of the nature of knowledge,rather the concepts of knowledge,while as a naturalist,he is very happy to see the achievements in science aid the resources of argument of intuition and tends to put the observation mechanism in science,especially psychology as an analogy to intuition and its mechanism.Hence,there is no reason to limit the philosophical theorizing within any methods,though traditional philosophy emphasizes ' armchair' approaches,since any limitation would isolate us from scientific consequences,which would be similar to appeal to intuition,the result of which would limit philosophical theorizing.