部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配

Political Connection of Ministers and the Allocation of Fiscal Transfer

分税制改革强化了中央财政集权,各部委掌握的资源越来越多,地方与部委的政治关联强度会显著影响其获得的财政转移支付。本文基于2003年部长更换的自然实验,利用倍差法研究了部长的政治关联的影响,研究发现:(1)新任部长的政治关联效应会使其来源地的地级市获得的专项转移支付增加2亿元,如果是重要部委的部长,该效应上升至9.4亿元,相当于在原有水平上增加130%;(2)政治关联效应在部长的一个任期之内是非线性的,呈现先上升后下降的"倒U型"的趋势;(3)增加政治关联和减少政治关联的效应是非对称的,部长卸任并没有伴随着专项转移支付的显著减少;(4)政治关联效应仅体现在正部长,副部长对其来源地获得的财政资源影响不大。

The political connection between local governments and ministries can significantly affect the fiscal transfer from the central government. Based on a natural experiment of ministers＇ reappointment in 2003, this paper studies the influence of ministers＇ political connection, to his birthplace, on the allocation of earmarked grants using Difference-in-difference identification. We find a newly appointed minister makes the earmarked grants of his prefecture increase 200 million. If it is an important ministry, this effect increases up to 940 million, equals to an increase of 130%. We also find the effect of political connection is nonlinear, which presents a reversed U-shape. The effect of increased and decreased political connection is unsymmetrical. The deputy ministers have little effect on the allocation of grants.