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基于CR社会偏好模型的团队生产研究 被引量:1

Team Product Research Based on CR-Social Preferences Model
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摘要 笔者将Charness等人刻画的社会偏好模型的简化形式应用于团队生产研究中,进而分析在不同的社会偏好条件下团队生产的效率问题,并重新审视Holmstrom提出的"团队生产中预算平衡与帕累托效率二者不可兼得"的定理。 The classical team product theory assumes that the players have purely self-interest preferences, but with the experimental economics and behavior game theory development, people pay more and more attention on social preferences; Charness et al (2002) made a series of game experiments, they tested different types of social preferences directly and formed a relatively better social preferences model. In this paper,we make a research on team product theory,using the simplified form of Chamess et al (2002) social pref- erences models, in order to analyze the efficiency of team production in different social preferences conditions and re-examine Holmstrom theorem "a balanced budget and pareto efficiency can not happen simultaneously in team production" .
作者 师伟 蒲勇健
出处 《经济经纬》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第4期104-109,共6页 Economic Survey
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(11CGL107) 江苏省社会科学基金项目(10EYC024) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金
关键词 社会性偏好 团队生产 互惠 实验 Social Preferences Team Product Reciprocity Experiment
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献24

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