公司治理与技术创新:两个基本模型

Corporate Governance and Innovation: Two Basic Models

公司治理作为企业运行的基本制度,应以创新和价值创造为导向。现有公司治理与技术创新关系的文献以经验研究居多,理论模型较少。本文构建了多任务情况下的"股东—经理模型"和企业层面的动态最优创新投资模型。前者表明经理在基本工作和创新工作上努力的边际成本均与占据工作职位的代理收益有关,也与两种工作的完成概率有关,经理关注创新活动的最佳条件是经理本身即是股东。后者显示企业最优的创新决策和公司治理质量对当期利润与未来利润均存在影响,创新决策需与公司治理质量相匹配,在当前利润和未来利润之间平衡。并且公司治理是有成本的,过度强调治理水平会对利润产生负面影响。

Corporate governance should be oriented towards innovation and value creation as it is the basic institution of a firm. However, the research on the relationship between corporate governance and innovation are mostly empirical. In this paper we provide two theoretical models. Firstly, a shareholder - manager model based on multitasks reveals that the marginal cost of basic and innovation work for managers are related to manager＇s agency benefits and the probability of fulfilling the tasks. The best condition for manages to concern innovation is that managers are shareholder themselves. Secondly, a dynamic innovation model shows that innovation decision and corporate governance simultaneously affect current and future profit of firms. Innovation decision should be matched with corporate governance, to be balanced between current and future profit. Moreover, corporate govenumce is not for free, the profit will be damaged ff corporate governance is overemphasized.