Power Pool中发电公司的竞价策略

BIDDING STRATEGIESOF GENERATION COMPANIESIN POWER POOL

研究了电力联营体 (Power Pool)中发电公司的报价策略。在非完全竞争的 Power Pool中 ,发电公司可以作为一个价格接受者 ,也可利用其市场势力操纵市场价格。发电公司作为价格接受者时将基于边际成本曲线报价 ,但其最低报价必须根据市场行情而变化 ;具有市场势力的发电公司可以采取限制产量、抬高电价的策略。 Power Pool中市场势力的存在不利于资源的优化配置和利用。

This paper studies the bidding strategies of generation companies in Power Pool. In an imperfect competition Power Pool, some generation companies (GenComs) may have market power. A GenCom can bid as a price acceptor or as a price changer. A price acceptor will bid according to its marginal cost curve, but the minimum bid price must be decided by dynamic programming based on price forecasting. A price changer will bid according to the strategy of restricting output and forcing up price. The Power Pool will be inefficient when market power of GenComs are strong.