非对称信息下水利工程建设项目质量监控

Quality supervision of hydraulic project construction under asymmetric information

研究了水利工程建设项目业主与承包商组成的建设供应链中业主在不同信息环境下的质量监督决策及质量保证金扣留策略。以质量监督水平和质量保证金扣留为业主的决策变量,质量控制水平为承包商的决策变量,建立了质量收益模型,运用极大值原理推导了业主在非对称信息下的质量监督决策及质量保证金扣留策略的最优解。通过仿真计算,分析了不同信息环境下业主的质量监督水平及质量保证金扣留与承包商质量控制水平之间的关系。有助于提高业主质量监控的有效性和可靠性,实现期望的质量控制目标和质量收益。

Supply chain, quality supervision decision and quality guarantee deposit detaining strategy of the owner and contractor are studied for hydraulic project construction in different conditions of information. A quality gain model has been developed with two owner＇s decision variables of quality supervision level and quality guarantee deposit detaining, and one contractor＇s decision variable of quality control level; optimal solutions have been derived for the owner＇s variables under asymmetric information by the maximum principle. Through simulation and calculation, the relationships between the three variables in different conditions of information are analyzed. This method is useful for improvement on the effectiveness and reliability of the owner＇s quality supervision and achievement of desired quality control objectives and quality gains.