食品安全管制的政府间博弈模型及政策启示

Inter-governmental Game Model and Policy Implication of Food Safety Regulation

食品安全管制的利益相关方之间存在多重博弈关系。其中,管制机构之间的博弈深刻影响着我国食品安全管制的制度安排和政策效率。政府间博弈包含平行的管制机构之间的横向博弈和不同层级管制机构之间的纵向博弈。食品安全管制政府间博弈模型分析的结论是,管制机构之间的横向关系应从分段管制走向综合管制,纵向关系应从分级管制为主走向省级以下垂直管制为主。

There are multiple game relations in interested parties of the food safety regulation. Of which, game relations among regulatory agencies profoundly impact the institutional arrangement and policy performance of food safety regulation. The inter-governmental game model contains horizontal game among regulatory agencies at the same power level and vertical game among regulatory agencies at different power levels. After making an analysis of inter-governmental game model of food safety regulation, a conclusion can be drawn that the horizontal relation among regulatory agencies should be developed from segmented regulation to comprehensive regulation and the vertical relation should be developed from focusing on graded regulation to direct regulation under the provincial level.