期刊文献+

国有企业“在位诅咒”与市场导向的改革思路 被引量:2

Incumbent's Curse in the SOEs and Market-oriented Reform
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摘要 如果处于新古典经济学完全竞争市场中,资源具有充分流动性,看不到沉淀成本对于在位国有企业改革的影响,企业可以自由进入和自由退出。然而,在中国国有企业改革过程中,沉淀成本构成民营企业的进入壁垒,同时构成国有企业的先行者优势,很容易造成国有企业"在位诅咒",严重阻碍国有企业发展和民营企业进入。因此,深化国有企业改革,必须将沉淀成本和国有企业垄断问题综合起来,积极引入市场竞争和促进民营企业进入,尽量消除国有企业"在位诅咒",即人为垄断,从而很好地坚持"两个毫不动摇",使国有企业处于良好的竞争性市场环境中,实现国有资本优化配置。 In terms of perfect competition, the lost or failed existing firm owners freely exit the market, creating normal competition. Based on the sun Hence it has been found that tial entry for the private firms k costs phenomenon in organization theory, the sunk costs leads to market failure for SOEs the sunk costs will result in entry barriers and incumbency advantage and restrict the poten. By means of first-mover advantage analysis, the new policy guidelines is provided to resolve the sunk costs faced by private firms and the sunk costs mechanism is provided, including market structure, governance structure and government regulation, in order to create a fair and equal competitive environment.
作者 汤吉军
出处 《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第7期34-41,共8页 Research on Economics and Management
基金 国家社会科学基金重大项目"推进经济结构战略性调整研究"(13&ZD022) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持项目"交易成本 沉淀成本与政府反垄断问题研究"(NCET-13-0247) 吉林大学985工程和创新团队项目"沉淀成本理论创新研究"(2013TD002)
关键词 先行者优势 国有企业 沉淀成本 在位诅咒 First Mover Advantage State-owned Enterprise Sunk Cost Incumbent' s Curse
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参考文献19

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二级参考文献41

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