法治水平、高管背景独董与高管薪酬——来自上市公司的经验证据

Legality,Independent Director with Executive Background and Executive Compensation: From the China's Listed Companies Empirical Evidence

本文基于社会比较理论和社会网络理论,以2007-2010年我国沪深两市上市公司为样本,考察独董背景特征对我国高管薪酬的影响,研究发现:(1)具有高管背景的独董并不能对高管薪酬的合理性进行有效监督,具有高管背景独董比例与高管薪酬具有显著的正向关系;(2)随着法治水平的提高,具有高管背景独董比例与高管薪酬的正向关系显著减弱。本文结果表明具有高管背景独董不利于抑制高管薪酬,但随着法治水平的提高,具有高管背景独董提高高管薪酬的行为能得到有效遏制。

Based on the social comparison theory and social network theory, the paper selected China＇ s listed companies as the research object from 2007 to 2010, and discussed the relation between executive background of independent director and executive compensation. The results showed that ： （ 1 ） Executive Background of Independent Director can increase Executive Compensation; （2） It will decrease between Executive Background of Independent Director and Executive Compensation with enhancement of the legal level. Our results indicate that the independent directors with senior background is not conducive to suppress executive compensation, with the legal level enhancement, the behavior that independent director with senior backgrounds increase executive pay can be effectively curbed.