省以下财政分权、地方政府行为与非税收入——来自闽、浙、赣三省的实证证据

Sub-Provincial Fiscal Decentralization,Local Government's Behavior and Non-tax Revenue——Empirical Evidence from Fujian,Zhejiang and Jiangxi Provinces

以福建省2002年实行的"县级收入自留"政策作为"准自然实验",分析了省以下财政分权后县级政府非税收入的变化情况。对福建、浙江、江西三省195个县的实证研究表明,省以下财政分权显著减少了人均非税收入,分权造成的税收收入增长不仅客观上减少了相应的地方政府非税收入,而且改变了地方政府收入筹集模式,主观上放弃了对非税收入增长的依赖。因此,非税收入管理改革必须建立在解决地方财政短缺问题的基础之上。

The local financial shortage causes a distortion of the local government behavior. This paper takes the policy of ＂ re- tention of county revenue ＂adopted in Fujian province 2002 as a ＂quasi-natural experiment＂, and analyzes the changes in the non-tax revenue after sub-provincial fiscal decentralization. The empirical results which contain 195 counties from Fujian,Zhejiang and Jiangxi show that the sub-provincial fiscal decentralization does significantly reduce the non-tax revenue per capita. Fiscal decentral- ization causes the increase of tax revenue, which not only decreases local non-tax revenue objectively, but also changes the mode of local government collecting revenue and dispels the will of local government choosing non-tax revenue. Based on the empirical results, we propose that non-tax revenue management reform must be established on the basis of solving the problem of the local financial shortage.