摘要
针对与"天价薪酬"相对的中国上市公司高管领取"零薪酬"现象,我们对CEO领取零薪酬的动机及其效果进行了实证研究。研究发现,CEO领取零薪酬既不是为了掩饰其谋求私有收益的真实动机,也不是通过零薪酬来表明其与公司共渡难关的决心,而是一种对自己薪酬计划的理性选择。此外,领取零薪酬的CEO的权力往往较大且通常过度自信,所在公司的资产负债率更高且专业委员会数量更少,而且零薪酬计划在短期内对公司绩效具有显著的负面影响。我们的研究表明,领取零薪酬虽然是CEO的理性选择,但对公司而言并不是一个很好的选择。
For the phenomenon that the executives in Chinese listed companies work for an annual salary of ¥0 compared to the sky-high compensation, this study examines the incentives and effects of the ¥0 salary. The study finds that the reason why some CEOs choose a TO salary is neither a ruse hiding the rent-seeking pursuits of CEOs nor overcoming the difficulties with the company, but rather a rational choice for their compensation plan. Besides, CEOs who work for a ¥0 salary tend to be powerful and overconfident, and the companies these CEOs work for have high asset-liability ratio and less number of committees, compared with other firms. Moreover, the ¥0 salary has a significant and negative influence on firm performance in the short term. These findings show that al- though ¥0 is a rational choice for CEOs, it is not a good choice for the company.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第7期81-90,共10页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
"泰山学者"建设工程专项经费资助项目
国家自然科学基金项目(71272119)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
CEO零薪酬
CEO特征
公司特征
公司绩效
¥0 CEO
characteristics of CEOs
characteristics of the firm
firm performance