会计稳健性与银行借款合约

Accounting Conservatism and Bank Loan Contract

从银行借款利率和担保概率两个方面,研究了会计稳健性对银行借款合约的影响。研究发现,会计稳健性能够降低借款利率,而非国有企业的会计稳健性能够降低借款担保概率。将借款银行分为国有四大行和非四大行的分组检验结果显示,四大行只对会计稳健的非国有企业在利率上有所优惠,而在担保概率上不会考虑企业的会计稳健性;非四大行会对会计稳健的企业在利率上有所优惠,但只针对非国有企业的会计稳健性降低担保概率。这一研究结果表明,会计稳健性会影响银行借款合约,但借款人的国有属性和贷款银行的垄断地位削弱了会计稳健性在借款合约中的作用。

This paper investigates how accounting conservatism affects bank loan contract from two aspects of interest rates and the probability of loans guarantee. The research finds that accounting conservatism can decrease bank loan interest rates, and account- ing conservatism in non-state-owned companies reduces the likelihood of bank loan guarantee. In the further analysis, dividing the banks into big4 state banks and non-big4 state banks, and taking grouping tests, it is found that, big4 state banks only give preferen- tial interest rates to the non-state-owned enterprises （non-SOE） with accounting conservatism and they do not think about the firms＇ accounting conservatism in the aspect of loans guarantee, and non-big4 banks give preferential interest rates to enterprises with ac- counting conservatism, but they just decrease the probability of loans guarantee for accounting conservatism in non-SOE. The conclu- sion in this study shows that accounting conservatism affects bank loan contract, but the borrower＇s state-owned property and the lending banks＇ monopolistic position weaken accounting conservatism＇s role in the loan contract.