风险规避度、工作激励与税收征管双方共赢机理分析

Risk Aversion Degree, Work Incentives and Both Sides of Tax Collection and Administration Win-win Mechanism Analysis

税收征管实践中,因双方信息不对称和利益诉求不一致,税收执法人员往往违背税务机关意愿,衍生逆向选择和道德风险问题。通过构建一个税务机关与执法人员之间委托代理博弈的模型指出,引入有效的奖惩制度以调整税收执法人员的风险规避度,进而提高其工作努力程度,可规避这一问题。特别是,它能促进理性的税收执法人意识到,符合税务机关意愿的行为才是个人私利最大化行为,唯有实现公共利益才能实现私人利益。

In the practice of tax collection and administration, because of asymmetric information and interests are not consistent, tax law enforcement officers often against the tax authority will, adverse selection and moral hazard problems. By building a principal-agent game between tax authorities and law enforcement personnel model, introducing effective system of rewards and punishments to adjust the degree of risk aversion, tax law enforcement officers, in turn, increase the degree of their hard work, can avoid this problem. In particular, it can promote the rational tax enforcer realized that individual behavior conforming to the tax authorities will is the self-interest maximization behavior, only the implementation of public interest can achieve personal interests.