制造商主导下的CLSC物流策略和供应链稳定性

Research on Outsourcing Strategies and Stability of Closed-loop Supply Chain with Dominant Manufacturer

针对制造商主导的闭环供应链系统,考虑物流策略对系统的影响,运用博弈论理论,分析了物流外包和物流自营时制造商和零售商的定价策略、物流策略以及供应链稳定性.分析发现,无论是物流自营还是物流外包,随着补贴的增大,批发价格的单位变动率和单位再制造节约成本的单位变动率相等,但是方向相反.关于物流策略,无论补贴高低,只要fg>1或者fg^2<1,则制造商和零售商在物流策略选择上始终一致,供应链具有长期稳定性.但若fg<1<fg^2,则制造商和零售商在物流选择上产生分歧,供应链具有不稳定性.

or the closed-loop supply chain system of dominant manufacturer, consideringthe effect of logistics strategy, applying game theory, pricing strategies, logistics strategy andsupply chain stability are analyzed. It is found that the unit change rate of wholesale pricesis equal to unit change rate of remanufacturing cost savings whether logistics strategy is self-logistics or logistics outsourcing, but its direction is opposite. For the logistics strategy, aslong as fg 〉 1 or fg2 〈 1, then manufacturers＇ choice of logistics strategy is consistentwith retailers regardless of the level of subsidies, supply chain system is long-term stability.However, if fg 〈 1 〈 fg2, then manufacturers＇ choice of logistics strategy is not consistentwith retailers, supply chain has no stability.