连锁高管与公司盈余管理行为的传染效应——来自中国上市公司的证据

Inter locked Executives and the Contagion Effect of Earnings Management

本文以2003-2009年发生过财务重述的A股上市公司及于其拥有连锁高管的公司为样本,研究盈余管理行为在连锁高管网络中是否具有传染效应。研究表明,财务重述公司处于"传染期"的连锁高管数目越多,其盈余管理行为越有可能通过连锁高管网络进行传染。同时还发现,在与重述企业连锁的非重述企业的连锁高管网络容易被"污染",产生"劣币驱逐良币"效应,不良会计行为更容易在连锁高管网络间传播;当连锁高管是独立董事和监事会成员时,会提高盈余管理行为通过连锁高管网络进行传染的可能性。

This paper selects the data of 2003-2009 China A share listed companies which had financial restatements and the companies which have interlocked executives with the restated companies as samples, in order to study whether the accounting behavior of earnings management will have contagion effect across the network of interlocked executives. The results of the empirical research show that the contagion effect of earnings management would be stronger if the number of interlocked executives is greater. What's more, our research also finds out some characteristics of interlocked executives in thecontext of China's economy. Among Chinese corporations, the non-restated companies which are interlocked with the restated companies tend to be'contaminated'. As has been said —— the bad drives out the good, the good accounting behaviors are hardly transferred across the network of interlocked executives while the bad accounting behaviors are more contagious. In addition, our research finds evidences that when the interlocked executives are independent directorsor members of board of supervisors, the contagion effect of earnings management are stronger.