国企产权改革中的职工持股问题——兼评“全民股份所有制”

Issues of Employee Share-holding in the Property Right Reform of State-owned Enterprises ——A Discussion on the “Universal Share-holding Ownership”

我国国有企业改革是以“两权分离”为主线的 ,实践表明 ,在国有制内涵保持不变的前提下 ,“两权分离”改革未能解决国企问题 ,反而更加暴露了国有产权的内在缺陷。职工持股的主张试图跳出“两权分离”的思维定式 ,以此解决国企产权问题。但是 ,这种主张在理论上乃是对马、恩当年提出的“社会直接占有”的一种简单化理解 ,在实践上则已被前南斯拉夫的改革失败所证明是行不通的。“全民股份所有制”也属于职工持股主张的一个改种 ,它既不能解决国有产权的内在问题 ,如所有者缺位、责权利不统一等 ,所而引出新的问题 ,如分配与绩效脱钩。

The“separation of ownership from control”constitutes the mainline in the property right refom of the state-owned enterprises(SOEs).Under the presumption that the nature of state ownership remains unchanged,it has been shown that such a reform can not touch the fundamental issues of the SOEs.Rather,the reform has explicitly revealed the profound drawbacks in the state-owned property right system.The employee share-holding perspective may be regarded as a switch from the “separation of ownership from control”paradigm.Theoretically,however,this perspective involves a misreading of Marx and Engels's earlier concep of the'direct social possession of production materials”,practically,the Yugoslavia's experiment on the workers'autonomy system has resultedin a historical failure.The employee share-holding system,as a variant of the 'autonomy system,could neither solve the intrinsic problems in the state-owned property right system,such as owner absentee problem,inconsistency of right,obligation and interest,etc.,nor could it avoid generating new problems,such as divorce between reward and performance ,free-riding problem,and resumption to earlier situation of leadership system in the SOEs.