信息不对称、社会成本与中小企业信用担保机构利润

Asymmetric Information,Social Cost and Credit Guarantee Agencies' Profit

信息不对称的情况下,中小企业信用担保机构充当着银行与贷款人之间信用桥梁的作用。信用可以弥补一些信息不对称造成的社会福利损失,银行等金融机构则可以通过转嫁的方式将成本转移到信用担保机构。通过数理分析得出:对中小企业政策扶持程度越高、信用担保机构与政府的资本结构关联程度越低,越可以明显增加中小企业信用担保机构的利润。政府可以用市场化手段管理中小企业信用担保机构,加大对中小企业的扶持力度,就能明显增加担保机构的利润,从而鼓励信用担保机构充当中小企业的融资中介。

Under the condition of information asymmetry, SME credit guarantee institutions as a credit Bridge be tween banks and borrowers. Information asymmetry caused social welfare loss, banks and other financial institutions can transfer cost to the credit guarantee institutions. We can draw conclusions through the mathematical analysis： the lower of the degree of the capital between credit guaranty institution and government, and the higher of the poli cy support degree to SME credit guaranty institution, which can significantly increase the SME credit guarantee in stitutions profit.